Autonomy and Strategy: What Should Europe Want? Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 110 by Howorth, Jolyon
  
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
No. [ ] 
[Date] 
No. 110 
April 2019 
Autonomy and Strategy: What Should Europe Want? 
Jolyon Howorth
Europe wants autonomy and it wants a 
strategy. Semantically, of course, 
“wants” has a double meaning. First, it 
means “lacks”. Europe lacks autonomy 
and it lacks a strategy. The second 
meaning of wants is “desires”. Here, we 
have a genuine question. How many 
EU member states genuinely desire 
autonomy for the EU? How many are 
genuinely in favor of a grand strategy – 
as opposed to the EU’s default practice 
of just muddling through?  And there is 
also a third meaning behind wants: 
“needs”. In my view, the EU needs 
strategic autonomy. But having said 
that, all I have done is set a point of 
arrival. How to get there? 
 
Robustness in security and defense is not really 
in the EU’s DNA. However, strategy and 
autonomy are demanding concepts. And 
strategic autonomy is a very challenging 
ambition. There are three main sets of 
discussions: What is it for? What does it require? 
And what does it mean? What is it for is a 
question about operations and capabilities. What 
does it require is a question about procurement 
and equipment. But what does it mean is a 
question about politics and strategy itself. All 
three sets of issues are crucial and any credible 
and viable strategic autonomy must ideally 
combine them.   
Part of the confusion about strategic autonomy 
derives from the different emphases placed on 
these different elements (politics, equipment and 
operations) at different moments. After Saint-
Malo’s first foray into autonomy in 1998, 
controversy arose essentially around the 
operational challenge of autonomy. What type 
of crisis management missions was the EU 
capable of undertaking without major US 
assistance? More recently, US objections to 
strategic autonomy, particularly following the 
launch of PESCO and the European Defense 
Fund, have focused on the procurement 
dimension. American officials are whipping up 
concern about the potential exclusion of US 
companies from future EU defense equipment 
funding. This is a hard-nosed issue which 
involves at best disingenuousness on the US 
part, at worst a massive dose of hypocrisy. The 
operational dimension is also back on the 
agenda. Sven Biscop recently argued (in Fighting 
for Europe)1  that the EU needs to aim for self-
reliance in four main areas of security: domestic 
security; crisis response in the neighborhood; 
“connectivity” with the world in space, airspace, 
cyberspace and on the high seas; and, eventually, 
territorial defense. The latter needed to be said! 
 
CLARITY ON THE STRATEGIC FINALITÉ   
Some analysts argue that discussions over the 
political/strategic dimension of strategic 
autonomy should be avoided as being either 
premature or divisive – or both. Step-by-step, 
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piecemeal progress, it is argued, is a more 
fruitful course than the elaboration of grand 
strategic objectives. I would argue, on the 
contrary, that without agreement on the long-
term political and strategic finalité of strategic 
autonomy (however contentious those 
discussions might be) there is little point in 
arguing about the nuts and bolts. 
 
Grand strategy has been defined as “the 
calculated relationship between means and large 
ends”. In that equation, the “large ends” are 
primary. To quote Seneca: “There is no 
favorable wind for the sailor who does not 
know where he is headed”. Many European 
leaders have begun to argue that the EU must 
“take its fate into its own hands”. But they don’t 
say what precisely they have in mind. The debate 
on the European Army is heating up. The 
“European Army” is a notion that confuses and 
irritates more than it clarifies and reassures2.  We 
need much greater lucidity about what exactly is 
meant by that notion. The question has to be: 
what exactly is it reasonable to expect the EU – 
autonomously – to be able to achieve in the 
Southern and particularly the Eastern 
neighborhoods? 
 
In tackling the political/strategic dimension of 
strategic autonomy, semantics are very 
important. Some of the negative reaction, 
particularly in the US, has been to the word 
“autonomy” itself, especially when coupled with 
the word “strategic”. In their recent report on 
NATO at Seventy - An Alliance in Crisis3, Nicholas 
Burns and Douglas Lute have suggested that a 
preferable concept for the EU might be 
“strategic responsibility”. Federica Mogherini, at 
this year’s Munich Security Conference, coined 
the expression “cooperative autonomy”. As the 
EU’s chief diplomat, she was expressing 
sensitivity to US objections to the 
imponderables of strategic autonomy. In the 
EUGS document, while the concept of 
autonomy appears no fewer than eight times, it 
is occasionally relativized by referring to “an 
appropriate level of ambition and strategic 
autonomy” (author’s emphasis).  But isn’t this, 
as the French would say, simply to noyer le 
poisson? 
 
Experts have been dancing like angels on 
pinheads around this issue of relativity. Sven 
Biscop distinguishes between “strengthening 
autonomy” (in domestic security), a “significant 
degree of autonomy” (Europe’s ‘connectivity’) 
and “full strategic autonomy” (in crisis 
response). Daniel Fiott, in Strategic Autonomy - 
Towards European Sovereignty in Defence?4, has 
usefully differentiated between “autonomy as 
responsibility”, “autonomy as hedging” and 
“autonomy as emancipation”. But, as he 
recognizes, “autonomy as responsibility” does 
not necessarily imply any real degree of 
European autonomy; and “hedging”, in addition 
to offering an insurance policy, is largely a way-
station on the road to emancipation. Nathalie 
Tocci recently wrote, in Navigating Complexity: 
The EU's Rationale in the 21st Century5, that 
strategic autonomy means “the ability to act, 
preferably with others, beginning with NATO 
and the US, but when necessary also alone”. But 
what do we mean by “when necessary”; and 
what does “alone” really imply? If Russia were 
actually to invade Latvia, and Donald Trump 
were to apply his “Montenegro test” for Article 
5, strategic autonomy would need to be seriously 
robust. We need to break out of semantic 
creativity and ambiguity and say clearly what we 
are talking about.  
 
Some argue that “autonomy” implies 
“separation” or “divorce”. But this is not 
attested by the Oxford English Dictionary, 
which defines “autonomy” as meaning: (1) the 
right or condition of self-government; (2) 
freedom of the will; (3) freedom from external 
control. I would argue that it is “freedom from 
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external control” that is the key concept. 
General de Gaulle, the only European leader to 
have actually pursued autonomy for France, 
distinguished between independence and non-
dependence. He insisted that non-dependence 
was the really appropriate term and the key 
ambition. Independence is a status. Non-
dependence is a relational situation. Strategic 
autonomy means not being dependent on a 
third party for one’s objectives, one’s policies, 
and one’s actions. 
I want to encourage people to adopt a rigorous 
semantic position. Autonomy, like pregnancy, is 
an absolute. You can’t be “a bit” autonomous. 
By the same token, a strategy that is not 
autonomous is little more than an aspiration. 
There is little point saying to Washington: 
“Please, sir, we want to be autonomous, but 
don’t worry, we won’t become so autonomous 
that you would no longer be in charge”.  
If the Europeans collectively lack confidence in 
their ability to achieve strategic autonomy, if 
they are not fully committed to it, or if they 
interpret the task weakly or half-heartedly, then 
both the concept and the ambition should be 
dropped as counter-productive distractions. If, 
however, as increasing numbers of EU leaders 
insist, and as their main strategy document 
proposes, they want to make the attempt, then it 
behooves them to devise a clear political plan 
for progressing towards it. 
 
THE EU AND NATO: NO ZERO-SUM 
What are the arguments of those opposed to 
strategic autonomy?  For what one might call 
“professional Atlanticists” (that’s not a 
pejorative term, it’s a job description), there is 
one over-riding consideration. To quote Jens 
Stoltenberg, strategic autonomy runs “the risk of 
weakening the transatlantic bond, the risk of 
duplicating what NATO is already doing, and 
the risk of discriminating against non-EU 
members of the NATO Alliance”. These are 
exactly the same arguments as those deployed by 
Madeleine Albright in her reaction to the Saint 
Malo Declaration twenty years ago.  Albright’s 
“3-Ds” (don’ts) were “no decoupling, no 
duplication and no discrimination”.  Strategic 
autonomy risks undermining NATO in a 
situation where, it is asserted, “the European 
Union cannot protect Europe by itself”.   
Very similar arguments were deployed in 
October 2017 by a number of leading German 
foreign-policy experts in the manifesto In Spite 
of it All: America 6. “Without the United States” 
the authors insisted, “there will be no security 
for and in Germany for the foreseeable future. 
[…] It would be an error of historical 
proportions to play out ‘more Europe’ against 
the trans-Atlantic alliance”.   
Strategic autonomy is also roundly rejected by 
the Central and Eastern European countries, 
which are increasingly concerned about the 
solidity of the US commitment to NATO’s 
Article 5. The cloud of uncertainty hanging over 
these states in the era of Trump remains dark 
and threatening. In that climate, all talk of 
strategic autonomy from within the EU is 
considered to be irresponsible: it “scares the hell 
out of us”7. 
John Bolton has insisted that if the Europeans 
ever “got to the point of achieving something 
concrete, that would be a dagger pointed at the 
heart of NATO”. The bottom line in these 
arguments is that European security must 
depend – seemingly forever – on US leadership. 
Why? Because there is an underlying assumption 
that the rise of the EU must inevitably involve 
the demise of NATO. A zero-sum relationship.   
But, without sounding Pollyannaish, we really 
must ask why does it have to be zero-sum? 
Never forget that when NATO was set up in the 
late 1940s, the fundamental objective was to 
offer a breathing space while the Europeans 
acquired the autonomous capacity to look after 
themselves. It was never intended to lead to 
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permanent European dependency on the US. 
As Eisenhower observed in 1951: "If in 10 
years, all American troops stationed in Europe 
for national defense purposes have not been 
returned to the United States, then this whole 
project will have failed”.  
STRATEGIC AUTONOMY MEANS COLLECTIVE 
DEFENSE  
I said at the outset that we need to think in 
seriously robust terms. Let’s not beat about the 
bush. Strategic autonomy must mean that, 
eventually, as was originally intended at the birth 
of the Alliance, the EU will become capable of 
providing for its own collective defense. Any 
other interpretation of strategic autonomy 
simply perpetuates dependency. All too few 
European exerts or analysts are prepared to go 
the whole hog and state unequivocally that the 
logical end-point of the autonomy process 
should be for Europe to be able to manage its 
own collective defense. 
This does not imply separation from the US, 
rupture of the Atlantic Alliance, decoupling or 
divorce. An enduring partnership between the 
two sides of the Atlantic would undoubtedly 
reinforce that EU collective defense capacity, 
but the capacity itself (political, industrial and 
operational) must nevertheless be 
autonomous.  Europe is as wealthy as the US, it 
has a much bigger population, it boasts 
technological, scientific, industrial and creative 
capacity as great as those of the US. It is (unlike 
the US) situated in a geographical area featuring 
numerous serious threats. In the name of what 
rationality should the EU elect to (want to) 
remain – in perpetuity – in a state of security 
dependency on the US? Why would the 
acquisition of serious military and defensive 
capacity by the EU be seen as undermining 
rather than strengthening the Alliance? 
 
If Europeans and Americans truly believe that, 
despite their differences, they share overall 
values and are closer to one another than either is 
to any other global actor, then the evolving 
transatlantic relationship can and will rise above 
short-term problems of adaptation. If Europeans 
fear abandonment because of a clash of 
transatlantic values and/or interests, then to 
accept a state of permanent dependency makes 
absolutely no sense. 
 
CONCLUSION: A MERGER BETWEEN CSDP 
AND NATO 
There remains the not insignificant issue of the 
framework for engineering such autonomy and 
for generating the concomitant strategy. The 
vast majority of experts and analysts who write 
on this problem suggest (implicitly or explicitly) 
that the means will involve the intensification 
and empowerment of CSDP. This will be 
managed by the EU institutional architecture we 
are now all so familiar with: EEAS, PSC, 
EUMS, EUMC, EDA and other agencies of the 
EU’s alphabet soup. It will be done outside of 
(albeit in cooperation with) NATO. It will be 
activated by the operational mechanisms of EU 
crisis management, particularly, many argue, 
PESCO. It will be assisted by the EDF and by 
growing Europeanization of equipment 
procurement. 
 
CSDP has defined itself in opposition to its 
short-lived predecessor, the European Security 
and Defence Identity (ESDI), precisely because 
of the challenge of autonomy. ESDI – in the 
mid-1990s – was an arrangement whereby the 
EU could develop competence and capacity via 
NATO. But it was also overtly a formula 
predicated on US global leadership and 
European regional followership.  Autonomy was 
taboo. That is why Saint-Malo, with its demand 
for autonomy, was seen as so revolutionary. But 
CSDP did not lead to meaningful autonomy. 
Whenever a genuine crisis arose on the EU’s 
periphery (the Balkan wars, Libya, 
Ukraine/Crimea) the Union resorted to NATO. 
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And NATO is not going away (just look at the 
new HQ). Which is why, today, the EU and 
NATO are “cooperating” intensely – 74 joint 
projects. One might ask whether there are any 
issues on which they are not cooperating. 
 
I believe that the road to genuine strategic 
autonomy lies through a merger between CSDP 
and NATO and to a gradual rebalancing of 
leadership and responsibility within an evolving 
alliance. This is still a minority approach, but it 
is  one that is attracting growing numbers of 
advocates. 
   
The entire cohort of American structural realists 
seems perfectly relaxed about letting Europe 
take over responsibility for its own 
neighborhood. They regard Russia as a declining 
power. Both Trump and Bernie Sanders 
(currently the two front runners for 2020) seem 
to imply something similar.  Hubert Védrine 
hinted at it in his 2012 report on France’s 
reintegration of the NATO integrated 
command. In that report, he coined the notion 
of the “Europeanization of NATO”. Sten 
Rynning, has speculated on the prospects for a 
“Europeanized NATO” as an accidental 
consequence of Trump’s assault on the 
international order. Daniela Schwarzer has called 
for the Europeans to play an increasing 
prominent role inside NATO. The notion of 
European leadership within the Alliance is 
implicit in Barack Obama’s concept of US 
“leadership from behind”.  Steven Metz, from 
the US Strategic Studies Institute, recently 
posited a version of the same idea when he 
suggested that NATO should “consider an 
arrangement in which the United States is the 
‘supporting’ rather than the ‘supported’ nation, 
with the position of Supreme Allied 
Commander finally shifting to a European 
general. America could be Europe’s backstop 
rather than its primary defender. Might 
Americans even ultimately consider a NATO in 
which the United States is formally affiliated but 
not a full member?8” 
 
I would suggest that this, ultimately, is the way 
we will have to go.  It should, at the very least, 
emerge as an explicit objective – the clear 
destiny that Seneca insists we have to have if we 
are ever to reach it. If we state that that is our 
objective, then we can begin serious work on the 
route map, study the tides and the trade winds, 
prepare for a long voyage. It will require 
seriously creative thinking about two crucial 
issues: nuclear weapons and political 
leadership.  It will take time, a lot of time. 2049 
– the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of 
Washington seems like a reasonable anniversary 
occasion by which to achieve European strategic 
autonomy – a mere ninety years late by 
Eisenhower’s metric.  I will be 104 by then, but 
hopefully still capable of raising a glass of 
champagne. 
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This Security Policy Brief is based on Prof. 
Howorth’s keynote address at the seminar 
that Egmont and the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies organized under the 
same heading at the University Foundation 
in Brussels on 12 March 2019. 
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